






































































































































The expensive energy revolution in Germany 
The implementation of the Energiewende is behind schedule
Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, Konrad Mazur
One year after the events of Fukushima the implementation of the new 
German energy strategy adopted in the summer of 2011 is being verified. 
Business circles, experts and publicists are sounding the alarm. The tempo 
at which the German economy is being rearranged in order that it uses re-
newable energy sources is so that it has turned out to be an extremely dif-
ficult and expensive task. The implementation of the key guidelines of the 
new strategy, such as the development of the transmission networks and 
the construction of new conventional power plants, is meeting increasing 
resistance in the form of economic and legal difficulties. The development 
of the green technologies sector is also posing problems. The solar energy 
industry, for example, is excessively subsidised, whereas the subsidies for 
the construction of maritime wind farms are too low. At present, only those 
guidelines of the strategy which are evaluated as economically feasible 
by investors or which receive adequate financial support from the state 
have a chance of being carried through. The strategy may also turn out 
to be unsuccessful due to the lack of a comprehensive coordination of its 
implementation and the financial burden its introduction entails for both 
the public and the economy. In the immediate future, the German govern-
ment will make efforts not only to revise its internal regulations in order 
to enable the realisation of the energy transformation; it is also likely to 
undertake a number of measures at the EU forum which will facilitate this 
realisation. One should expect that the German government will actively 
support the financing of both the development of the energy networks 
in EU member states and the development of renewable energy sources 
in the energy sector. 
The guidelines of the new German energy strategy…
The	key	guidelines	of	the	new	German	energy	strategy	are:	withdrawal	from	the	use	of	nuc-
lear	energy	by	20221,	a	more	extensive	use	of	renewable	energy	sources	(RES),	the	develop-	
ment	 of	 transmission	 networks,	 the	 construction	 of	 new	 conventional	 power	 plants	 and	
an	improvement	in	energy	efficiency.	This	strategy	is	to	be	based	primarily	on	the	advan-
cement	of	renewable	sources	of	energy.	Pursuant	to	the	amended	RES	Act,	 the	share	of	
renewable	 energy	 in	 power	 production	 is	 to	 gradually	 increase	 from	17%2	 at	 present	 to	
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approximately	 38%	 in	2020.	 This	 share	 is	 to	 reach	 approximately	 50%	 in	2030,	65%	
in	2040	and	as	much	as	80%	in	2050	(see	Appendix).	The	amended	RES	Act	envisages	














…and the difficulties with putting them into practice









which	 is	 to	 support	 the	 development	 of	
renewable	energy	sources,	 the	main	pro-
blem	 is	 low	 cost-efficiency.	 Neither	 Ger-
man	nor	 foreign	companies	are	willing	to	
invest	 in	 new	 conventional	 power	 plants	
due	 to:	 (a)	 the	 low	cost-efficiency	of	 the	
construction	and	operation	of	gas	and	coal	
power	plants,	given	the	perspective	of	RES	
development	 in	Germany5,	(b)	 the	 low	or	
















































The implementation of the key 
guidelines of the new strategy, such as 
the development of the transmission 
networks and the construction of new 
conventional power plants, is meeting 
increasing resistance in the form 
of economic and legal difficulties. 















subsidies	 are	 due	 anyway.	 Therefore,	
the	 latest	 draft	 amendment	 of	 the	 RES	
Act	of	9	March	2012	provides	for	a	reduc-















































































To carry through the energy strategy, 
the German government will need 
to introduce a number of legal chan-
ges, i.e. to take care of the complete 
implementation of the laws on which 
the energy transformation is based, 
to implement comprehensive manage-
ment of the project and to offer 
economic incentives to investors.
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the	 act	 on	 underground	 storage	 of	 CO2,	 ‘the	 CCS	 (Carbon	 Capture	 and	 Storage)	 Act’
11.	
The	former	is	likely	to	be	adopted,	while	the	latter	has	no	chance	of	being	supported	in	the	















should	 directly	 take	 over	 the	 supervision	
of	the	implementation	of	this	strategy.	
Energiewende would	 be	 much	 easier	 to	
implement,	 if	 Germany’s	 largest	 energy	
companies	 became	 engaged	 in	 it.	 Only	
two	months	 following	the	presentation	of	

















































It will still take a long time before 
the total costs of the implementation 
of the new energy strategy can be preci-
sely assessed. Reports from various re-
search centres and economists present 
very different estimates, ranging from 
20 billion to 300 billion euros to 2020.




The energy transformation in Germany is not perceived as an element of protection of 










Energiewende as a ‘new social deal’ is to consolidate German society using this as a pivo-
tal idea, to bring sense to this policy, but first of all to become a catalyst and stimulus for 
innovation, technological development and a new driving force of the German economy. 
Germany	is	already	one	of	the	largest	manufacturers	and	exporters	of	green	technologies17.	
Energiewende is	 also	 presented	 as	 an	 antidote	 to	 dependence	 on	 imports	 of	 raw	mate-
rials,	a	chance	for	maintaining	a	high	position	in	international	trade18	and	a	way	to	escape	
the	consequences	of	‘peak	oil’19.
These goals would be much easier to achieve, if Germany adopted an evolutionary ap-
proach to replacing its nuclear and conventional power plants with those based on re-
newable energy sources. The	sudden	resignation	from	the	support	offered	by	the	nuclear	
power	plants	and	 the	absence	of	a	coordination	of	activity	as	part	of	Energiewende	has	
brought	 about	 great	 dissatisfaction	 in	
business	 circles,	 anxiety	 among	 experts	
and	alarmist	reports	from	the	media.	The	
stock	 exchange	 index	 where	 thirty	 com-
panies	from	the	green	technologies	sector	
are	listed	has	fallen	by	approximately	60%	
since	 April	 201120.	 The	 share	 prices	 of	
the	 largest	 energy	 companies	 (which	are	
to	take	part	 in	the	implementation	of	the	
new	energy	strategy	along	with	the	sector	













In addition to streamlining the decision-making processes and the implementation of 





























































Such strong engagement from politi-
cians and the activity of an exceptio-
nally strong lobby supporting green 
technologies are turning the energy 
transformation into an ideological issue. 
Thus a new ‘taboo topic in German 
politics’  is being created, which does 
not allow a cool-headed analysis to 
be made of the costs or an evaluation 
of the schedule of introducing the 
changes in the German energy system.






































































Energiewende can be improved by shifting the problem to the EU level. This has been 
admitted by German experts: “if energy transformation in Germany is to be successful, 
it must be backed up with political initiatives at the EU level”26.	Therefore,	it	may	be	ex-
pected	that	representatives	of	the	German	government	will	take	measures	to	push	through	
or	back	initiatives	in	the	following	areas:	(a)	supporting	the	development	and	coordination	
of	 networks,	 both	 German	 and	 cross-border,	 including	 financing	 them	 from	 EU	 sources	
(the	proposed	sum	is	9.1	billion	euros	for	2014–2020	as	part	of	TEN-E27);	(b)	propagat-
ing	 the	 German	 model	 of	 energy	 trans-
formation	in	Europe	in	order	to	boost	the	
demand	 for,	 and	 thus	 cost-effectiveness	














The chances of success for Energie-
wende can be improved by shifting 
the problem to the EU level. This has 
been admitted by German experts: 
“if energy transformation in Germany is 
to be successful, it must be backed up 
with political initiatives at the EU level”.
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Sources: The German Ministry for the Economy; the German Association of Energy and Water Industries
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2. The structure of power production from renewable energy sources 
in Germany in 2009 and a production forecast for 2020
Source: the German Ministry for the Natural Environment
Wind power 40.8%
Solar energy 7.0%
Onshore wind power 33.5%






The structure of power production from renewable energy sources (2009)
Forecast for power production from renewable energy sources (2020)
